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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff a,nd Respondent, 
-vs.-
EDGAR GLEN CUDE, 
Defenda,n,t a.nd Appellarn.t. 
Case 
No. 9619 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEl\iENT OF POSITION ON REHEARING 
The respondent, State of Utah, submits that the de-
cision of the court heretofore filed on July 2, 1963, revers-
ing the appellant's conviction of larceny, should be re-
examined and that the original opinion should be with-
drawn and the conviction affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 
THE COURT'S OPINION ASSUMES THAT, 
IF THE DEFENDANT TOOK HIS VEHICLE 
UNDER A GOOD FAITH BELIEF THAT HE 
HAD A RIGHT TO THE POSSESSION OF HIS 
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VEHICLE, SUCH GOOD FAITH BELIEF 
COULD DESTROY THE REQUIRED MENS 
REA THAT IS AN ELEMENT OF THE CRIME 
CHARGED, WHICH ASSUMPTION IS ERROR. 
Appellant, Edgar Glen Cude, was convicted of grand 
larceny. The facts as indicated in the opinion of the 
court are that the appellant took his automobile from a 
garage repairman who had performed repairs upon the 
vehicle. In Sta.te v. Pa.rker, 104 Utah 23, 137 P. 2d 626, 
this court realized that an individual could be convicted 
of grand larceny by destroying the lienholder's posses-
sory right to the property upon which he has performed 
repairs. In the court's decision rendered in the instant 
matter, the court states: 
"It is fundamental that an essential element of 
larceny is the intent to steal the property of 
another. Consequently, if there is any reasonable 
basis in the evidence upon whir)l the jury could 
believe that the accused thought he had a right to 
take possession of his automobile, or if the evi-
dence in that regard is such that it might raise 
a reasonable doubt that he had the intent to steal, 
then that issue should be presented to the jury. 
The principle is correctly stated in 52 C.J.S., p. 
999, that if the property was taken under any 
' * * * circumstances from which the jury might 
infer that the taking was under a claim of right, 
the accused is entitled to an appropriate charge 
distinguishing larceny from a mere trespass.' '' 
It is apparently the position of the eourt that, if the 
appellant took possession of his vehicle in good faith, 
thinking that he had a right to do so, he could not have 
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the n•quisite me11s rca. It is admitted as a general prin-
<'iple of In w that, where a specific mens rea is required, 
if the defendant's mistaken state of mind is of such a 
nature as to obviate the mens rea,, the required criminal 
intent is lacking and the accused cannot be convicted. 
However, the court's initial premise in the instant case 
i::-; unsound, for it assumes that the required mens rea is 
the intent to deprive the possessor of his compensation 
and that it was necessary to show an intent to ''steal'' 
his automobile. This premise is unsound, since the mens 
rea is not the intent to steal or to deprive the lienholder 
of compensation, but to deprive the lienholder of his 
"possessory right." Perkins, Crimin,al Law (1958) page 
:2:24. A lienholder has a possessory right to retain the 
autmnobile until paid for his work, but has the primary 
possessory right to hold the property and, if necessary, 
to satisfy the debt against him from that property. 
Therefore, the required mens rea, in an offense like that 
·with ·which the appellant was charged, is not the intent 
to steal but the intent to deprive the lienholder of the 
possessory right to the property. The appellant's good 
faith would only be a defense if it demonstrated that he 
did not intend to deprive the lienholder of the possession 
of the vehicle. Not one shred of evidence was before 
the court either at the trial or upon appeal which would 
show that the appellant had any other intent than to 
take the vehicle from the possession of the lienholder 
and sell it. 
The evidence overwhelmingly shows without a single 
contradiction that the appellant intended to sell the ve-
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hicle (R. 66 to 1). Appellant at no time testified that he 
intended to return the vehicle or to grant the lienholder 
his possessory right. Consequently, the state of mind that 
the appellant had at the time he took the vehicle was 
clearly that of an intent to deprive the lienholder of his 
possessory right, and, although he may have taken the 
vehicle under the belief that he had a right to do so, such 
a state of mind where the vehicle was taken with the 
intent of permanently removing it from the lienholder's 
possession would not be such a state of mind as would 
exculpate the appellant from the crime charged. As a 
consequence, there was no evidence before the trial court 
which would have warranted the court in instructing the 
jury. 
The nature of the circumstances under which a claim 
of good faith is made must be examined to determine 
·whether or not the claim of good faith would blot out the 
criminal intent required. Appellant's position and thus 
the court's position would be correct only if the intent 
vvould be the general intent to steal as distinct from the 
specific intent to deprive of a possessory lienholder's 
right. The lienholder has a right, not only to payment for 
his work, but a right to satisfy that debt out of the prop-
erty possessed. Consequently, any act that would deprive 
the lienholder of his right to satisfy his debt out of the 
property would not be such an intent as could be exculpa-
tory of the required mens rea. 
The Supreme Court of Canada in Regina Y. Shym-
kowich, 1954 S. Ct., 606, had before it a case where the 
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l listrict Court of the Province of British Columbia had 
entered an acquittal, and the Court of Appeals of British 
Columbia affirmed on the grounds that the respondent, 
who took logs under the believe that they were aban-
doned, could exculpate himself because of a good faith 
belief. The lower courts had ruled this would be exculpa-
tory of the required intent for the crime. The court ruled : 
''The taking into possession and the conver-
sion of the logs obviously was intended to deprive 
the owner temporarily at least of its property and 
this comes within the express language of the defi-
nition of theft given by the Criminal Code." 
It is noteworthy that, in the opinion of Justice Estey 
to the degree that it relates to the instant facts, he stated: 
'' * * * The conduct of the respondent, in the sub-
mission of the Crown, in going into and trespass-
ing upon the booming ground with the intent and 
purpose of collecting floating logs therein, though 
not inside a boom, was itself, in the circumstances, 
such evidence of dishonest or wrongful intent 
that the mere assertion on his part that he thought 
he had a right to collect floating logs would not 
establish an honest intent.'' 
The Supreme Court of Canada reversed the acquittal 
and directed that a conviction be entered. 
Certainly, therefore, where the instant opinion of the 
court is predicated on an erroneous premise as to the 
requisite mens rea, the court should withdraw its opinion 
and grant rehearing. Further, where the factual status of 
the record is such that there is not a scintilla of evidence 
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exculpatory of the required men rea actually involved in 
the crime, the court should grant a rehearing. 
As the court's opinion now stands a mistake of law 
has been made, not only by the accused but by the court. 
CONCLUSION 
The opinion of the court makes a serious and glar-
ing mistake of law in that it assumes that the mental ele-
ment of the instant offense is other than the intent to de-
prive the lienholder of the right to satisfy his indebted-
ness from the possession of property, and assumes that 
it is the intent to deprive the lienholder of payment. Since 
it is obviously clear that the appellant did intend to de-
prive the lienholder of possession of his property per-
manently, the court should affirm the conviction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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